INTRODUCTION
After the global financial crisis from [2007] [2008] [2009] , there has been a renewed interest, both from national and supranational supervisory authorities and researchers, to develop measures in order to monitor in real time and to keep under control macrofinancial inbalances that could disrupt financial stability. An essential step in this respect was realized by developing systemic risk 1 indicators to quantify cross-sectional and temporal dimensions of systemic risk, and to implement macroprudential measures that are able to limit the systemic character of financial institutions and to reduce the vulnerability of financial system that amplify the shocks. 2 To this end, one should take into account the interaction between real economy and the financial sector since there could accumulate mismatches in balance sheet of entities (usually assets are long-term and liabilities short-term) -corporations, financial institutions, households, and the public sector (Ghosh, 2016) . Indeed, during the crisis many countries experienced risk spillover form one segment of the economy to another, in many cases the vulnerabilities amplified to the point when they became systemic (Cervantes et al., 2014) .
The aim of this study is to elaborate early warning indicators for Romania using relevant macroeconomic and financial variables. More precisely we depelop an aggregate index of mcrofinancial instability for the perioad 1998q1-2020q4 3 employing data from Oxford Economics. Hence, based on data projeted by Oxford Economics, our intention is to forecast the evolution of the index until 2020. 4 The analysis starts in the first quarter of 1998 because the 1 In general, a risk is defined as the possibility of loss. Freixas et al. (2014) define systemic risk as "the risk of threats to financial stability that impair the functioning of the financial system as a whole with significant adverse effects on the broader economy". For other definitions and surveys, see De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) and Silva et al. (2017) . 2 Ghosh (2016) defines vulnerability as the susceptibility to loss coming from the exposure of the financial system to negative shock, internal conditions and risk management -the latter being the process that implies confronting the risk either ex-ante (preparing for shocks) or ex-post (mitigate negative effects). Adrian et al. (2015) point out that vulnerabilities include leverage, maturity transformation without support from the government, compressed pricing of risk (i.e., values of the assets that are higher with respect to fundamental values in accordance with historical standards), interconnectedness, and complexity. They group vulnerabilities in four categories: (i) banking sector, (ii) nonbanking sector including shadow banking, (iii) assets markets and (iv) nonfinancial sector. 3 "q" stands for quarter. 4 In a recent survey realized by Duke University / CFO Global Business on June 7th, 2019 on approximateky 600 CFOs from all over the world, including 250 from North America, 62 from Asia, 99 from Europe and 32 from Africa, most of them expect a new recession in the country they activate by the end of 2020. 23 countries from the European Union over the 1982q1-2012q3 period, the authors conclude that, besides credit-to-GDP gap, other domestic and global factors, such as equity prices, house prices and the variables describing banking sector activity could be employed for monitoring the accumulation of financial imbalances for member states. Against this backdrop, we include in our analysis several variables that are capable to catch the overheating of macrofinancial activity, grouped into specific categories. Based on these categories, we determine the utility of these variables from two perspectives: (i) whether these indicators are able to detect overheating of macrofinancial activity in Romania in two periods characterized by systemic crises 6 , i.e. the banking crisis from 1996-2000 and the global financial crises which started in Romania in November 2007 and ended in August 2010 and (ii) whether these variables successfully minimize various statistical errors involved in forecasting future events. over 90% of them see a recession coming by the end of 2020, followed by those from Europe with 70%. Against thist backdrop, it is very relevant to analyze the evolution of financial stability in Romania in 2020. 5 Other similar studies (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; 2009a;  2009b; 2011; Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jordà et al., 2013) point out the leverage (credit) is a first-order factor in explaining banking crises and the fact that the effect on the real economy is worse when the crisis is preceded by a credit boom. Therefore, there seems to be a consensus that "leverage is the Achilles heel of capitalism" as James Tobin put it in his book review on "Stabilizing an unstable economy" by Hyman P. Minsky (Tobin, 1989 ). 6 According to European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), Romania has experienced three systemic crises: from November 1981 to December 1989, with the main cause being the external shock of oil crisis from 1977 combined with the increase in the interest rate by the Federal Reserve; from January 1996 to December 2000, with the root cause being the excessive credit growth and leverage, liberalization of the exchange rate and the start of the liberalization process for the goods with administered prices; and from November 2007 to August 2010, with excessive credit growth and leverage, mismatches and market illiquidity being the key drivers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the methodology to select the indicators, in Section 3 we present the empirical results, and in Section 4 we conclude.
METHODOLOGY

Selecting relevant indicators
To capture the interaction between real economy and financial sector, this study will include the selection of the relevant indicators in three steps that are exhibited in Figure 1 .
Step 1 involves selection of the candidate indicators based on previous studies realized for other countries or group of countries. Because we want to make a quarterly prediction for 2020, we are constrained by the availability of the data provided by Oxford Economics. Hence, some data will be derived from other specific variables. For instance, the best proxy for global volatility is VIX, but because Oxford Economic does not realize forecast for this indicator, we use the conditional volatility of MSCI World index from a GARCH (1, 1) model with t disturbances. Similar to Ito et al. (2014) , in some cases different processing methods will be used for the same data. For example, for credit, besides the creditto-GDP ratio, we also employ q-o-q credit growth. In Step 2, selected variables will be grouped in six different categories, as follows: (i) macroeconomic risks, (ii) bank risks, (iii) activity of corporations and households, (iv) monetary and financial conditions, (v) risk appetite and (vi) external shocks.
The overall economic risks are closely linked with financial stability (Cervantes et al., 2014) . Economic growth influences the income of households and corporations and consequently ability of debtors to pay their debts. Inflation / deflation affects financial stability through real prices of assets, fixed-income markets and fiscal burden, while fiscal policy and public debt have important implications on country risk (Corsetti et al., 2012), and the latter has the ability to create systemic risk (Adrian et al., 2015) . As macroeconomic activity can influence developments in the financial sector, outlook and expectation for macroeconomic activity can influence the outlook for financial stability (Ghosh, 2016) .
Financial intermediation in Romania is realized primarly through banking sector. In this context, monitoring the evolution of banks' balance sheet indicators is of great importance, being able to detect in advance the overheating periods caused, for instance, by the excessive credit growth. Moreover, banks' balance sheet risk can become credit risk for the government (an enhanced public debt) if it has to step in and save the systemic institutions that are too big to fail through bail-out (Cervantes et al., 2014) . Alternatively, a higher public debt that is reflected in higher financing costs, could affect the profitability and solvency of banks. Because the sector of households and the sector of corporations include mutual indicators and the data for latter is limited, we compute a single index to capture the risks of households and corporations. Variables from this category reflect esentially the debt as a share of GDP, equity prices and house prices. A key channel for transmission of financial crises to the real economy is the wealth effect of households and nonfinancial entities (Adrian et al., 2015) , and an increased lending to these sectors leads to systemic risk accumulation (Borio et al., 2001; . A high leverage ratio for households and corporations induces a limited capacity to absorb the adverse shocks on income or asset prices, and the reduction in spending following these shocks will amplify the negative effects.
Monetary conditions refer to monetary policy, while financial conditions are especially reflected into the capacity and willingness of the banks to grant loans (Cervantes et al., 2014) . From the macrofinancial standpoint, financial stability is linked with monetary policy (Clouse, 2013) , while financial conditions affect economic growth (Hatzius et al., 2010) . On the one hand, the consequences of monetary policy decisions can be found in short-term interest rates and money supply growth. On the other hand, financial conditions are most faithfully reflected in the overall credit growth in the economy. Last but not least, external shocks will be quantified through the real prices of commodities (gold and oil), volatility of the MSCI World index (investors' expectations), long-term government bond yield for the U.S., real effective exchange rate (REER) 7 of leu and exchange pressure market index (EMPI). 8 In
Step 3, we select the most suitable indicators on the basis of statistical evaluation. First, for variables chosen in Step 1, we compute the trend and the cycle (gap) employing three methods: one-sided Hodrick-Prescott (HP), two-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter and averages based on 12-quarters moving average. For macroeconomic variables (national accounts) we use in the HP filter 9 a smoothing parameter (lambda) of 1,600 as suggested by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) for quarterly data. For financial variables, the lambda will be set at 100,000 similar to Alessi and Detken (2011) . It is worth mentioning that the variables from the six categories listed above can be simultaneously in several categories. Hence, for 7 Measure of the inflation-adjusted strength of a currency (RON, in our case) against a basket of currencies that includes the main trading parteners of that country (Romania, in our case). Increase (decrease) in REER indicates that the exports are more expensive (cheaper), while imports are cheaper (more expensive). Therefore, a higher REER denotes a drop in competitiveness in trade with other countries. 8 This concept has been used for the first time by Girton and Roper (1977) and extended afterwards by Weymark (1995; 1998) , measuring the total pressure of an exchange rate (USD / RON in our case) that has been tempered by the interventions of authorities in the foreign exchange market or by changing the exchange rate regime. For details, including the methodology adopted in this paper, see Patnaik et al. (2017) . 9 The HP filter decomposes a time-series into a grow component ( ) and an additive cyclical component ( ), and reduces to minimization of the variance of the cyclical component subject to a penalty for the variation in the second difference of the growth. For details, see Hodrick and Prescott (1997) . The one-sided HP filter is used for real-time estimations, employing only past observations. In contrast to one-sided HP filter, the two-sided HP filter is applied to the entire sample of the original series to extract the trend of all periods at once, i.e., using both past and future values. Rünstler and Vlekke (2018) argue that policymakers have to rely on past observations only because future values would not be available for real-time estimations (Stock and Watson, 1999) .
every category in part we build an index of macrofinancial vulnerabilities that will ultimately be aggregated in a single aggregate indicator. The gap indicators (actual value minus the long-term trend) will be evaluated based on two criteria: (i) whether these indicators are able to detect overheating of macrofinancial activity in Romania in two periods characterized by systemic crises, i.e. the banking crisis from 1996-2000 and the global financial crises which started in Romania in November 2007 and ended in August 2010 and (ii) whether these variables successfully minimize various statistical errors involved in forecasting future events. Furthermore, every variable is standardized by deducting its mean (longterm trend) and dividing the results by its standard deviation (i.e., the z-score) and categorized according to its relationship with vulnerabilities (risk), as shown in Figure 2 : (i) one-way variables, for which an increase in their values (increase in zscore) leads to a rise of the risk (e.g., public debt / GDP, BET index volatility etc.), (ii) one-way variables, inverted for which a decrease in their values (decrease in zscore) determines a rise in the risk (e.g., fiscal balance / GDP, industrial production growth etc.) and (iii) two-way variables, for which the further their z-scores from zero, the greater the risk (e.g., output gap, inflation etc.).
To detect the overheating of the financial activity, we need to evaluate the values of each indicator in comparison with a specific threshold. Since we cannot know a priori these thresholds, we will examine several threshold levels. For this purpose, we compute the root mean square (RMS) of gaps, noted with in Eq. (1), and examine four cases: 1 RMS, 1.25 RMS, 1.5 RMS and 1.75 RMS: (1) where is the actual value of the variable, is the long-term trend of the same variable at time t, and N is the number of observations. The first statistical evaluation refers to the capacity of variable to signal the overheating of financial activity by moving above the upper threshold in a particular period of time. In our case, the overheting periods correspond to the banking crisis from 1996-2000 (1998q1-2000q4, according to the availability of the data) and the global financial crisis from Novermber 2007 to August 2010 (in this case, we set the overheating period three quarters earlier, i.e. 2007q1-2010q3, in order to select the variables that have an early warning component). Indicators that will not issue any signal will be discarded from the analysis at this stage, and the remaining indicators will be assessed in the next stage.
When one studies the values of a certain indicator to analyze financial vulnerabilities within a country or a market it is ideal that overheating signals to be issued ahead of a financial crisis, and not to be issued if there is no crisis at all. The ideal scenarios are A and D, exhibited in the table below: 
One-way
Note: * BET index volatility, MSCI World index volatility and the change in NEER volatility have been calculated using the GARCH (1, 1) process with t disturbances. *** 10-years government bond yield volatility has been calculated as the spread with U.S. 10-years government bond yield.
One can note that that some indicators from specific categories may have different relation with the risk (e.g. Credit granted by banks / GDP growth has a two-way relation with Macroeconomic risk and a one-way relation with Banks risk The threshold level should be set to a relatively low value if one wants to minimize Type I errors (the risk of omitting crises), signals being thus emitted at an ealy stage. This will allow to send warning signals whenever the risk of a crisis occurs. At the same time, it is necessary to keep the reference level to a relatively high value in order to reduce Type II errors (the risk of signaling false crises). Therefore, there is a trade-off between these two objectives that is exhibited in Figure 3 , the threshold level being selected to minimize the loss function.
Three out of four statistical models to assess the selected indicators are based on a loss function that is a weighted average of probability of Type I and Type II errors For every single indicator selected in Step 1, along with the relevant method to extract the trend and the threshold level, we calculate the loss functions for the four models described above, and select the model that minimizes the loss function. For example, in the case of GDP, initially we will select the first statistical model with 0.5 and the three methods to extract the trend (i.e., one-sided and two-sided HP filters, and 12-quarters moving average), in combination with the four threshold levels, i.e., 1 RMS, 1.25 RMS, 1.5 RMS and 1.75 RMS, having 12 combinations in total. From these results, we will select those with the minimum loss function and the relevant trend extraction method. Then, the following indicator is assessed through the lens of the same methodology (e.g., inflation). The process is repeated for all statistical models, i.e., with = 0.75, = 0.9, and the one that minimizes the NS ratio (based solely on indicators that that issue signals in more than 2/3 of the overheat indication period).
Building the heatmap
Before describing the methodology to build the heatmap, it's necessary to present the construction of indicators:  Each category from the six abovementioned is represented by an aggregate indicator  Each aggregate indicator is determined based on elements  Each element is derived from k individual economic or market subindicators.  Each sub-indicator uses l variables ( ) derived from m series (
The index of macrofinancial vulnerabilities is determined based on the six aggregate indicators , being the simple average mean. For each variable k at time t we apply the three methods to extract the gaps, the trend in this case being the mean of the variable. Each cyclical component (effective variable minus the trend) is then standardized, as follows: (5) where is the mean (trend) and is the standard deviation. Then, for each category we build aggregated indicators based on standardized indicators, giving equal weights: (6) After this, we estimate the distribution of each aggregate indicator using a nonparametric gaussian kernel estimator. 38 Their periodic observations are transformed into the [0, 1] interval based on their quantile in the historical distribution, where 0 denotes the absence of macrofinancial vulnerabilities, while 1 denotes maximum risk. This process takes into account the relation of indicators with vulnerabilities. If the indicator is one-way, nothing is changed. If the indicator is one-way and inverted, the order of the percentiles is reversed in such a way that values close to 1 represent observations close to the minimum historical values (maximum risk). In the case the variable is two-way, then the rescaled indicator is replaced with (1 minus rescaled value) for observaions that are below the median of historical observations. Since the steps from the process of building the indexes imply first standardization, then computing the averages and in the end rescale in the [0, 1] interval, computing the averages of categories will not produce the value of the aggregate index.
In the end, we will build the heatmap according to Figure 4 , assigning each indicator four colors (green, yellow, orange and red), the intensity of which will depend on the value of the z-score and on the linkages of variables with macrofinancial vulnerabilities. Figure 5 presents the heatmap of macrofinancial activity in Romania over the 1998q1-2020q4 period. Besides the aggregate index, the other six indexes are also shown, in accordance with the categories mentioned above: (i) macroeconomic risks, (ii) bank risks, (iii) activity of corporations and households, (iv) monetary and financial conditions, (v) risk appetite and (vi) external shocks. Initially, we started with 39 indicators as shown in Table 1 .
THE HEATMAP OF MACROFINANCIAL ACTIVITY IN ROMANIA
After the Step 1, we have eliminated the variables with the gaps correlated more than 80% and the ones that did not present an early warning component for systemic crises experienced by Romania. In the end resulted 31 indicators rhat can be found in Table 3 together with the method used to extract the cycle, the threshold level and the references parameter of policymakers. Aslo, the variables are exhibited in ascending order based on the average loss given by the loss function.
Red areas on the heatmap are associated with difficult periods experienced by Romania, i.e., with increased macrofinancial vulnerabilities. Thus, one can observe that all indexes corresponding to six categories and the aggregated index per se have increased significantly during the banking crisis and global financal crisis. In the second quarter of 2018, the index advanced by more than 50% as compared with previous qurter, driven by the rise of three components: bank risks, risk appetite and external shocks. Therefore, we can imply the usefulness of the index that measures macrofinancial activity in Romania, having an early warning component and indicating overheating of the macrofinancial activity ten quarters ahead of global financial crisis that started in Romania in the last quarter of 2007. As for the year 2020 based on forecasted data by Oxford Economics, the index indicates a relatively high vulnerability, with an average of 0.64 across all four quarters. It should be noted that the forecasts were made at the end of fourth quarter of 2018 and, given the unpredictibility of the macroeconomic and financial environment in Romania, amplified by frequent legislative changes and political instability, one should expect significant changes. 39 In Figure 7 is exhibited the 39 In a recent analysis of the International Monetary fund (IMF) from June 7 th , 2019, the experts point the deepening of macroeconomic imbalances caused in particular by the growth of the twin deficits (i.e., current account deficit and fiscal deficit) and by the increasing inflationary pressures as the main problem that our country faces. Thus, among the countries from the region (Romania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Greece) Romania ranks the first for springs estimates realized by the European Commission for fiscal deficit / GDP (-3.5% in 2019 and -4.7% in 2020) and current account deficit / GDP (-5.2% in 2019 and -5.3% in 2020). The real economic growth from the previous years (4.8% in 2016, 7% in 2017 and 4.1% in 2019 with projections of 4% in 2019 and 3.7% in 2020 according to the European Commission's summer estimates) has been fueled by rising consumption, at the expense of investment, through procyclical policies (e.g., wage growth, including the minimum wage, without a similar increse in labor productivity, and pension growth without any budgetary revenue coverage). Also, the rate of inflation is situated at high levels given the constant evolution in the European Union (EU) (e.g., the rate of infltion in May was 4.1% and the EU average was 1.6%). The National Bank of Romania (NBR) sees a rate of inflation of 4.2% at the end of 2019, well above the self-imposed target of 2.5%, ± 1 percentage point. These aspects contribute to the image of risky contry for Romania in international financial markets, thus increasing the costs of external financing. External shocks should also be considered in the context of a US-China trade war, the uncertainty of the UK exit from the EU, and the negative yields of the 10-years government bonds (long-term interest rates) (e.g., the cases of Germany, France and Japan) where their notional value, according to Bloomberg, exceeded $13.4 trillion in June, where investors do not request anymore a risk premium for their investments in long-term fixed-income securities of developed countries. This means that many capital flows (including speculative flows) will enter emerging countries, including Romania, where interest rates are still positive and attractive. The global volatility of the government bonds, measured by Macaulay duration of the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Treasuries Total Return Index was 8.32 years in June, meaning that an increase in the yield of one percentahe point leads to a loss greater than $2.4 trillion.
Besides the CDS spreads, we compare the performance of the index of macrofinancial activity with the median probability of default (PD) for Romanian economy for three different maturities: 3, 6 and 12 months, i.e. 1, 2 and 4 quarters. The data is taken from Credit Research Initiative (CRI) and follows Duan et al.'s (2012) methodology. They propose forward-looking PD-term structures of public firms using both macrofinancial and balance sheet data. One of the covarites from the prediction model is distance to default based on Merton's (1974) model which views firm's equity as a call option on the value of firm's assets, and debt is taken as a strike price. Forward-looking PD is a much comprehensive measure of a company's default probability, and a major advantage of this approach is that one can compute PDs for different maturities. According to CRI, the number of public companies included in the model is 88, and the measures PD 3M, PD 6M and PD 12M are computed as the median of all 88 companies for the three maturities, being available starting with the fourth quarter of 1998. One can observe the positive correlation of our index (left-hand axis) with PD of Romanian economy (right-hand axis) (Figure 8 ). If our index had the maximum value in 2009q2 (0.99), according to the model of Duan et al. (2012) , the Romanian economy faced the greatest difficulties during the banking crisis (1998q4), when the probability of default was 0.64% (PD 3M), 1.12% (PD 6M) and 1.77% (PD 12M). In the last quarter of 2018, PD 12M is 0.24, indicating a very low probability of default for Romanian economy in 2019. In the same context, PD 24M (unreported) is 0.6%, i.e., there is only 0.6% probability for Romanian companies to default in the next two years, conditional upon their survival upon 2020q3. In comparison, the index of microfinancial activity averages 0.66 in 2019 and 0.64 in 2020, which indicates a relatively high vulnerability.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Overheating of economic and financial activities leads to macrofinancial imbalances that may disrupt financial stability, and can be detected by studying relevant indcators. In this study we developed an aggregate early warning index of macrofinancial activity for Romania over the 1998q1-2020q4 period, employing data from six categories: (i) macroeconomic risks, (ii) bank risks, (iii) activity of corporations and households, (iv) monetary and financial conditions, (v) risk appetite and (vi) external shocks. Based on these categories, we determined the utility of these variables from two perspectives: (i) whether these indicators are able to detect overheating of macrofinancial activity in Romania in two periods characterized by systemic crises, i.e. the banking crisis from 1996-2000 and the global financial crises which started in Romania in November 2007 and ended in August 2010 and (ii) whether these variables successfully minimize various statistical errors involved in forecasting future events. Initially we started with 39 indicators, to finally select only 31 of them based on which the aggregate indicator was built. This index recorded the highest values during the banking crisis and global financial crisis, and managed to send signals of increased vulnerability as early as the second quarter of 2005. Based on the data forecasted by Oxford Economics, the index will average 0.64 in 2020, indicating a relatively high risk, and confirming the concerns of approximately 600 CFOs from all over the world, most expecting a new recession in their country of activity by the end of 2020. Comparing the evolution of our index with a series of indicators that measure investors' perception of macrofinancial stability or the probability of default of Romanian economy (i.e., CDS spreads and the probability of default for different maturities), one can note the positive correlation between these two, but our index exhibits a more pronounced early warning component, making it extremely useful in anticipating future systemic crises.
